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Casenotes
CAN WE REALLY ASCRIBE A DOLLAR AMOUNT TO
INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION? HOW PHONEDOG V.
KRAVITZ MAY DECIDE WHO OWNS A TWITTER ACCOUNT




Twitter is a social media website that has exploded in the past
five years, gaining in size, notoriety, and capability.2  Launched in
2006 by a San Francisco, California dot-com company, Twitter was
initially met with criticism.3  Initially, much of the technology com-
munity projected that it would fail.4  Recent years, however, have
seen the public perception of Twitter change drastically.5  In fact, it
was projected that by March of 2012, Twitter would surpass 500 mil-
lion registered users worldwide.6  Twitter is now one of the primary
1. Noah Kravitz, Posting of @noahkravitz to Twitter (Dec. 30, 2011, 07:53
AM), available at https://twitter.com/noahkravitz/status/152779343901376512.
2. See Chelsea Doyle, The History of Twitter, MAINE TODAY DIGITAL (Dec. 21,
2011, 4:17 PM), http://www.mainetodaydigital.com/2011/the-history-of-twitter/
(noting that by 2009, Twitter was third most popular online social networking web-
site); id. (“It’s been five years since Twitter began, and every year it manages to
grow bigger and better.  It represents the internet’s rapid progress and it shows no
signs of slowing down anytime soon.”); see also Twitter News, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19,
2011), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/twitter/index.
html?inline=nyt-org (“With more than 200 million accounts, Twitter is part of an
elite group of social Web start-ups that have flourished in recent years by rapidly
attracting users.”).
3. See Twitter News, supra note 2 (discussing early ridicule of Twitter, “as it was R
derided as a high-tech trivia or the latest in time-wasting devices”).
4. See, e.g., Michelle Slatalla, If You Can’t Let Go, Twitter, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/14/fashion/14Cyber.html?page
wanted=1&_r=0moc.semityn.www&adxnnl=1&ref=twitter&adxnnlx=1348074292-sb
caLsuRGp9%20SZhAz9oJnA (discussing early confusion over functionality and
purpose of Twitter).
5. See Twitter News, supra note 2 (noting new perception of, and respect for, R
Twitter after extensive use of Twitter to “organize protests and disseminate infor-
mation in the face of a news media crackdown” during Iranian presidential elec-
tion in June 2009).
6. See Lauren Dugan, Twitter to Surpass 500 Million Registered Users on Wednes-
day, ALLTWITTER, (Feb. 21, 2012, 12:30 PM), http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwit-
ter/500-million-registered-users_b18842 (noting at time of writing, Twitter had
498,862,688 registered users, and was projected to pass 500 million next day); id.
(133)
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and most efficient sources of news media, it affords businesses
unique marketing capabilities, and it allows anyone and everyone to
have their voice heard.7  “Twitter is a way for the entire world – all
around the world – to talk about what’s happening right here and
now in the fastest possible way.  It’s instant.  If knowledge is power,
Twitter is all knowing.”8
Twitter’s meteoric rise in popularity and social standing did
not come without some costs.9  Twitter quickly became the center
of many legal battles, and to this day, there are still a myriad of
issues that remain unresolved.10 PhoneDog v. Kravitz, a recently spot-
lighted lawsuit between a mobile phone review website and a de-
parted worker, has garnered national attention.11  When this case is
decided, it may shed light on who owns a Twitter account – the
(“If Twitter keeps growing at this rate, it will reach 1 billion users in about a year
and a half – but it might even be sooner than that, as its growth continues to
accelerate.”).
7. See Doyle, supra note 2 (noting rise of Twitter due to early use by celebri- R
ties, ease with which businesses could market deals and special events, and ability
for people to “say anything [they] want[ ]”); see also Pedram Tabibi, Legally Tweet-
ing: 5 Legal Issues for Twitter Users, LONG ISLAND BUS. NEWS, (Mar. 30, 2012), http://
libn.com/youngisland/2012/03/30/legally-tweeting-5-legal-issues-for-twitter-
users/ (“Twitter’s popularity is growing by the day, and the Tweet is now a daily
(and preferred) method of communication for many.”).
8. Doyle, supra note 2. R
9. See Tabibi, supra note 7 (discussing legal issues that have accompanied R
Twitter’s expansion); see also, e.g., Editorial: As Twitter Expands, Legal Issues Abound,
STAR TRIBUNE (Minn.) (Feb. 7, 2012, 8:41 PM), http://www.startribune.com/opin-
ion/editorials/138816249.html?refer=y (commenting on legal issues that have
confronted Twitter during its rise to popularity).
10. See Tabibi, supra note 7 (outlining various legal issues, including em- R
ployee/employer ownership of Twitter accounts, intellectual property, defama-
tion, confidential information, and use of Twitter in trial proceedings); see also
Editorial: As Twitter Expands, supra note 9 (detailing early legal issues confronted by R
Twitter, specifically pertaining to censorship).
11. See PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Nov. 8 Opinion] (dealing with ownership and valu-
ation of Twitter accounts); PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2012 WL
273323, (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2012) [hereinafter Jan. 30, 2012 Opinion] (dealing with
same); see also Nancy Messieh, PhoneDog v. Noah Kravitz: The Twitter Case Continues,
THE NEXT WEB (Feb. 12, 2012), http://thenextweb.com/socialmedia/2012/02/
02/phonedog-vs-noah-kravitz-the-twitter-case-continues/ (discussing national me-
dia attention received by PhoneDog case due to potential impact on social media);
Michele Sherman, Do Your Social Media Accounts Belong to Your Business?  Why Worry,
When There Are Safeguards You Can Take Now, 17 NO. 1 CYBERSPACE L. 18 (2012)
(“The world is closely watching a federal case in the Northern District of California
where a mobile news and reviews resource company . . . is suing a former employee
(or independent contractor, depending on what news report you read) over who
owns a Twitter account . . . .”); Maureen Minehan, Protect Social Media Assets from
Departing Employees, 29 NO. 6 EMP. ALERT 1 (Mar. 22, 2012) (“Anticipating a surge
in similar cases as companies increase their use of social media for marketing and
other purposes, employment experts are watching the PhoneDog suit closely.”).
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employer or the employee.12  Further, the case will be the first to
deal with the valuation of Twitter followers, as the plaintiff in the
suit is alleging damages in the amount of $2.50 per follower per
month.13
The outcome of this case may have a profound impact on the
use of social media, as businesses are increasingly using social me-
dia websites like Twitter and Facebook to communicate with fans
and customers.14  Because the law typically lags behind social devel-
opments and many legal situations of this nature have yet to be en-
countered, let alone adjudicated, “[t]his [case] will establish
precedent in the online world, as it relates to ownership of social
media accounts.”15  However, it is not entirely clear yet how influen-
tial this precedent will be.16  The facts alleged in the case may ulti-
mately confine the holdings to a narrow set of circumstances,
leaving many questions still unanswered.17
This Comment examines PhoneDog v. Kravitz, focusing on the
ownership and valuation issues central to the case.  Part II will detail
what Twitter is and how it works, and will outline how businesses
are currently using Twitter.18  Part III will introduce the factual and
procedural history of PhoneDog v. Kravitz.19  Part IV of this Com-
ment will analyze PhoneDog’s claims against Noah Kravitz and will
opine as to the potential outcome of the claims.20  Finally, Part V
12. See Nov. 8, 2011 Opinion, supra note 11, at *3-4 (discussing legal argu- R
ments of ownership for both sides).
13. See id. at *4 (discussing lack of industry standard for valuation of Twitter
followers, noting that “there is no evidence that a Twitter account has any mone-
tary value.”).
14. See John Biggs, A Dispute Over Who Owns a Twitter Account Goes to Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 25, 2011, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/26/
technology/lawsuit-may-determine-who-owns-a-twitter-account.html (quoting state-
ment of Henry J. Cittone); see also Henry J. Cittone, CITTONE & CHINTA LLP, http://
cittonechinta.com/index.php/attorneys/henry-j-cittone/ (last visited Oct. 26,
2012) (detailing Cittone’s intellectual property background).
15. See id. (“The lawsuit, though, could have broader ramifications than its
effect on Mr. Kravitz and the company.”).
16. See Sherman, supra note 11 (“PhoneDog does not enter court with the R
best of facts in order to decide [the] larger issues of interest to employers and the
social media community.”).
17. See id. (noting that facts alleged may not lead to strong precedent outside
specific circumstances therein).
18. For a further discussion of Twitter, see infra notes 23-64 and accompany- R
ing text.
19. For a further discussion of PhoneDog v. Kravitz, see infra notes 65-145 and R
accompanying text.
20. For analysis of the issues presented in PhoneDog v. Kravitz, see infra notes
146-235 and accompanying text.  It must be noted that at the time of the writing of R
this Comment, PhoneDog v. Kravitz is in the pleading stages of the suit.  Any and
all opinions as to the validity and potential outcomes of the claims are based solely
3
Kolansky: Can we Really Ascribe a Dollar Amount to Interpersonal Communicat
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-1\VLS105.txt unknown Seq: 4 19-FEB-13 10:07
136 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20: p. 133
will provide concluding remarks and suggest some precautionary
steps for both employers and employees to take in order to safe-
guard their use of social media websites.21
II. #TWITTER
“Following me will not cost me money. Seriously. Can’t believe I’m saying
this! Follow if you want, it’s FREE! (please RT) #$2.50.”22
—@noahkravitz
A. THE BASICS
According to Twitter’s website, “Twitter is a real-time informa-
tion network that connects you to the latest stories, ideas, opinions
and news about what you find interesting.  Simply find the accounts
you find most compelling and follow the conversations.”23  To be-
gin with, each Twitter user must create a unique Twitter username,
or Twitter handle.24  Upon signing into Twitter, each user has a
personal profile page unique to that user.25  From this profile page,
a user can perform any number of actions, including sending out
communications to other users and reading those messages sent
out by other users.26
Twitter users communicate through short messages called
tweets.27  Each tweet can have a maximum of 140 characters.28  The
text box in which users compose their tweets poses the question:
on complaints and other pleadings, and on rulings of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California on pretrial motions.
21. For concluding remarks and precautionary steps that employers might im-
plement, see infra notes 238-252 and accompanying text. R
22. Noah Kravitz, Posting of @noahkravitz to Twitter (Dec. 27, 2011, 1:08
PM), available at https://twitter.com/noahkravitz/status/151726156201213952.
23. About, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/about (last visited Mar. 14, 2012); see
also Jennifer Benz, Say it All in 140 Characters, 23 EMP. BENEFIT NEWS 12 (2009),
available at http://www.benzcommunications.com/files/documents/0000/0373/
Say_it_all_.pdf (providing background information on Twitter); What is Twitter,
TWEETERNET, http://tweeternet.com/#explained (last visited Mar. 14, 2012)
(“Twitter is a social networking and microblogging service that allows you answer
the question, ’What are you doing?’ by sending short text messages 140 characters in
length, called ‘tweets’, to your friends, or ‘followers.’”).
24. See John Jantsch, Using Twitter for Business, JOHN JANTSCH.COM, 3 (2009)
http://johnjantsch.com/TwitterforBusiness.pdf (explaining Twitter handle or
username).
25. See id. (outlining features of profile page).
26. See generally id. (discussing uses of Twitter and utility for businesses).
27. See About, TWITTER, supra note 23 (noting that “[a]t the heart of Twitter R
are small bursts of information called tweets.”).
28. See id. (noting that tweets can contain up to 140 characters); Steven Levy,
Twitter: Is Brevity the Next Big Thing?, THE DAILY BEAST (Apr. 29, 2007, 8:00 PM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2007/04/29/twitter-is-brevity-the-next-
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“What are you doing?”29  A user may answer this question in a tweet,
or transmit just about anything else to millions of other users
around the world.30  Tweets can contain photos, videos, and hyper-
links in addition to text, enabling users “to get the whole story at a
glance, and all in one place.”31
Twitter users may tweet as often as they like.32  One can tweet
by sending a message over the Twitter website directly, by using
short message service (“SMS”), or through a third party applica-
tion.33  These messages are posted on the user’s profile page, on
the profile page of the user’s “followers,” and on the Twitter Public
Timeline.34  There is a search function on Twitter’s homepage that
allows a user to search for topics and people.35  Additionally, users
may choose to “follow” topics or people.36  When one user follows
another, all of the tweets by the followed user will appear on the
following user’s homepage.37  A user’s homepage consists of all
tweets sent out by the accounts followed, in chronological order.38
The “following” capability is akin to subscribing to a user’s page in
that all tweets by the users that you follow will come up on your
timeline.39
These are some of the defining characteristics of Twitter that
set it apart from most other social networking sites.40  Specifically,
big-thing.html (explaining 140 maximum and providing example of length of 140
characters for “yardstick” measurement).
29. See What is Twitter, supra note 23 (“explaining how users transmit tweets”); R
Rebecca Haas, Comment, Twitter: New Challenges to Copyright Law in the Internet Age,
10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 231, 232 (2010) (noting that tweets “gener-
ally answer one question: ‘What are you doing?’”).
30. See Haas, supra note 29, at 236 (“Twitter users’ answers vary, as some users’ R
Tweets are akin to stream of consciousness, while others Tweet facts, share stories,
or just keep tabs on each other.”).
31. About, TWITTER, supra note 23. R
32. See Levy, supra note 28 (noting that tweets may be sent as frequently as R
one desires).
33. See What is Twitter, supra note 23 (outlining ways in which tweets can be
sent).
34. See id. (discussing ways in which users can access other users’ tweets).
35. See Haas, supra note 29, at 236 (explaining search capabilities of Twitter). R
36. See id. (outlining “following” function).
37. See id. (noting that once user has chosen to follow another user or topic,
the follower receives all tweets sent out by accounts that he or she follows); see also
Phillip Gragg & Christine L. Sellers, Twitter, 102 LAW LIBR. J. 325, 325 (2010) (“Fol-
lowing someone on Twitter means getting their updates in your personal time line.
If you follow someone, you’re their follower.  If they follow you, they are your
follower.”).
38. See What is Twitter, supra note 23 (detailing homepage and noting chrono- R
logical order of tweets).
39. See id. (comparing following feature to subscription).
40. See id. (discussing unique features of Twitter).
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the short nature of tweets supports quick and informal information
sharing, accessible to anyone, anywhere in the world.41  Further,
the “follow” function allows users to get messages and information
from countless other users that one would not normally communi-
cate with otherwise.42
Twitter has a number of other functions and capabilities that
make it so attractive to personal users and businesses alike.43  When
creating a tweet, a user can direct that message to another person
using the “@handle” function.44  The person to whom the tweet is
directed will see it in his or her own timeline, and while the tweet
will still be transmitted to the public, this lets other readers know
that the tweet was directed at a specific user.45  Additionally, Twitter
has a Direct Messaging (“DM”) function in which a tweet is sent
only to one person and cannot be seen by the public.46
Further, users may “retweet” messages to the public.47  When a
user retweets a message, the user is forwarding a tweet written by
someone else such that it is more easily visible to the followers of
the user that transmitted the retweet.48  “Retweeting is . . . vital be-
cause it means if someone retweets your update, everyone on their
list will see it too.  That doubles or triples your viewership with one
click.  This is the essence of how the internet can spread like
wildfire.”49
Additionally, “hashtags” allow users to tag tweets with a topic.50
Hashtags work by including the “#” symbol followed directly by one
or more words or characters with no spaces.51  These hashtags are
an easy way for tweeters to link or connect their tweets to any given
41. See id. (discussing break from use of email and instant messaging services).
42. See Twitter News, supra note 2 (“Unlike most text messages, tweets are R
routed among networks of friends.  Strangers, called ‘followers,’ can also choose to
receive the tweets of people they find interesting.”).
43. See Jantsch, supra note 24 (discussing various uses of Twitter enabled by R
specific functions, including search functions, lists, and retweets).
44. See Benz, supra note 23 (discussing Twitter lingo and explaining how users R
can communicate with specific people using this function).  For example, some-
one who wanted to send a message to Noah Kravitz would include his Twitter han-
dle “@NoahKravitz” somewhere in the tweet.
45. See id. (“[B]ut remember it is all public.”).
46. See id. (noting that DM “is a private tweet.”).
47. See id. (discussing retweet function).
48. See Doyle, supra note 2 (discussing retweet function and its ability to R
spread information quickly).
49. Id.
50. See Benz, supra note 23 (discussing hashtags). R
51. See Jantsch, supra note 24 (noting that hashtags are “a way people catego- R
rize tweets so that others might use the same tag and effectively create a way for
people to view related tweets. . . .”).
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topic, and users can search for topics, like people, on Twitter’s
homepage.52  Also, frequently tweeted topics appear on each user’s
Twitter profile page, allowing users to easily follow those that are
“trending up.”53
One common criticism of Twitter is that it can become an in-
formation overload of sorts.54  However, it is possible to whittle
down the content such that it becomes manageable and easy to un-
derstand.55  Twitter has a function where users can create lists of
topics and other users.56  For instance, a user could make a sports
list, a news list, or a list of high school friends.  Further, the list
function allows each user to monitor other users without having to
follow them and further clutter the user’s personal homepage.57
B. TWITTER FOR BUSINESS
In recent years, Twitter has exploded on the business scene,
providing an effective and efficient marketing and communication
tool.58  Without having to spend much time, or money for that mat-
ter, businesses are able to communicate with their customers and
market their products and services to any one of Twitter’s many
users.59  Additionally, once a company has become established in
the “Twittersphere,” it can target specific groups of followers de-
pending on the message it wants to send.60
52. See Benz, supra note 23 (noting that hashtags “allow[ ] anyone to easily R
follow a conversation or specific topic through search applications.”).
53. See id. (discussing how hashtags are “trending up” when they are fre-
quently used in the Twitter community).
54. See id. (noting that “many people describe Twitter as an online cocktail
party, and while at first glance, there’s just a bunch of noise, if you listen a little
more clearly, you’ll see that people are exchanging interesting and valuable infor-
mation and/or just having a good time.”).
55. See Jantsch, supra note 24 (outlining various methods to sort through mas- R
sive amounts of information on Twitter).
56. See id. (explaining list function).
57. See id. (“You may actually want to follow people you find on a list, but you
may also want to monitor industry niche lists for a week or two while you’re pitch-
ing a new client in that industry.  You can delete a list very easily, deleting hun-
dreds of followers is harder.”).
58. See id. (“As twitter has grown in popularity the ways that businesses and
brands use the service has naturally evolved.  While twitter is widely considered a
tremendous tool for one to one engagement, relationship building and network-
ing, it is also showing interesting opportunities for broadcast tactics.”).
59. See Benz, supra note 23 (noting ease with which Twitter can be used by R
businesses).
60. See Jantsch, supra note 24 (discussing “evidence of organizations success- R
fully using twitter to promote and broadcast content, events, campaigns and
launches in ways that followers find valuable.”).
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Not only does Twitter allow businesses to broadcast informa-
tion about their products, upcoming deals, and events, but it has
become a useful way for businesses to converse with their custom-
ers.61  Twitter can serve as a great market research tool, as busi-
nesses can easily follow what people are saying about them.62
Companies can also reply to the customers, creating a more per-
sonal relationship between the business and its customer base.63
Along these lines, many companies have started using Twitter as a
help-desk.64
III. #FACTS: THE PHONEDOG CASE
“Social Media Users: Be very careful when using your company’s
name in your online handles. Never know how/when your
employers might react.”65
—@noahkravitz
Section A of this Part will discuss the factual background of the
PhoneDog case.66  It will detail Kravitz’s employment at PhoneDog,
his responsibilities, including the use of the Twitter account, and
the circumstances that led to the eventual filing of the suit.67  Sec-
tion B will provide a brief outline of the procedural history of the
case, including information on the claims asserted by PhoneDog
and the various counterclaims and motions filed by Kravitz.68  Sec-
tion B will then examine the Court’s ruling on Kravitz’s motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The analysis of
61. See Doyle, supra note 2 (discussing use of Twitter by businesses to broad- R
cast promotional information to customers and followers).
62. See Jantsch, supra note 24 (recognizing utility of information Twitter can R
provide to companies).
63. See Doyle, supra note 2 (noting that businesses can “also converse with R
their customer.  They can reply back and forth if the customer has a question, and
it makes them feel heard.  Respected.”).
64. See Jantsch, supra note 24 (noting that recently, “something happened to R
customer support - a great deal of it moved on to twitter.”); see also id. (“Now that
twitter has grown to about 20 gazillion users almost any company can and should
be offering customer service and support via this mechanism.  The expectation is
growing for some users that all companies provide a level of support using this
platform.”).
65. See Noah Kravitz, Posting of @noahkravitz to Twitter (Dec. 27, 2011, 4:18
PM), available at http://twitter.com/noahkravitz/status/151773991688867840.
66. For factual and procedural background of PhoneDog v. Kravitz, see infra
notes 70-145 and accompanying text. R
67. For information about Kravitz’s employment, responsibilities, and ac-
count use, see infra notes 70-98 and accompanying text. R
68. For discussion of procedural history of PhoneDog v. Kravitz, see infra
notes 99-145 and accompanying text. R
8
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PhoneDog’s claims, and opinions as to the potential outcome of
each claim, will follow in Part IV of the Comment.69
A. Factual Background
PhoneDog Media operates an interactive website that provides
news and product reviews for new and forthcoming mobile de-
vices.70  Established in 2001, the site operates as a privately owned
and operated company based in South Carolina.71  According to
the profile of Tom Klein, CEO and Co-Founder of PhoneDog Me-
dia, the website has been developed “with a simple philosophy in
mind: to provide the consumer with un-biased reviews and interest-
ing content within the wireless industry.”72
The site provides users with the resources needed to research
and compare mobile devices, along with other information “that
users rely on to make important decisions about their next mobile
purchases.”73  Additionally, PhoneDog.com has an e-commerce
wing that allows users to “shop from those providers that fit their
needs.”74  Noting that the site attracts “2.5 million unique visitors
each month,” PhoneDog boasts that “[s]ite editors are highly en-
gaged, frequently replying to comments and forum threads and ele-
vating the conversation to the next level.”75
69. For analysis of PhoneDog’s claims and their potential dispositions, see in-
fra notes 144-219 and accompanying text.
70. About Us, PHONEDOG MEDIA, http://www.phonedog.com/content/
aboutus/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2012) (outlining company profile); see also Sheri
Qualters, Who Owns Your Twitter Account? #Itmaynotbeyou, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 2, 2012),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202541203680 (noting that
PhoneDog is online company that reviews mobile products and services).
71. See About Us, PHONEDOG MEDIA, supra note 70 (discussing origins of R
PhoneDog Media); see also Defendant’s Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff PhoneDog, LLC’s Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 12(b)(1) and for Failure to State a Claim under Fed.
R. Civ. Proc. Rule 12(b)(6); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
Thereof at 2, PhoneDog v. Kravitz, 2011 WL 5415612 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) (No.
C11-03474), 2011 WL 6955638 [hereinafter Defendant’s First Motion to Dismiss]
(noting that PhoneDog is incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of busi-
ness in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina).
72. TKDog, PHONEDOG MEDIA, http://www.phonedog.com/authors/tkdog/
(last visited Jan. 25, 2012).
73. About Us, supra note 70 (describing PhoneDog.com). R
74. Id. (outlining e-commerce wing).
75. Id. (describing PhoneDog.com). But see Plaintiff PhoneDog, LLC’s Oppo-
sition to Defendant Noah Kravitz’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim at 1, PhoneDog v. Kravitz, 2011 WL
5415612 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) (No. 3:11-cv-03474-MEJ), 2011 WL 6955629
[hereinafter Plaintiff’s First Opposition] (stating that “[e]ach month, PhoneDog’s
website attracts approximately 1.5 million users each month, and its videos reach
an average audience of 3 million viewers per month.”).
9
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Noah Kravitz, the defendant in the suit, worked for PhoneDog
in various capacities from April of 2006 until October of 2010.76
During his time at PhoneDog, Kravitz worked as an editor, product
reviewer, and video blogger.77  His primary role was to submit both
written and video content to the company that was then made avail-
able to PhoneDog’s users.78
In a message to PhoneDog users addressing the lawsuit, CEO
Tom Klein explained that at the time Kravitz joined PhoneDog, the
company “was in the very early stages of becoming the personality-
driven mobile tech review site it is today.”79  Klein further notes that
PhoneDog found Kravitz to be a “very talented and charismatic edi-
tor/video blogger and an excellent addition to represent
PhoneDog.”80  As such, PhoneDog took a number of steps to in-
crease their public exposure and hired multiple public relations
agencies in an effort to expand their reach.81  To that end,
PhoneDog sent Kravitz to trade shows around the world, and he was
“frequently featured on CNBC, Fox Business, and other national
and local media outlets.”82  Klein explains that through these ef-
forts, the website increased in popularity and Kravitz “became a
micro-celebrity of sorts.”83
At some point during his time at PhoneDog, Kravitz began us-
ing a Twitter account with the Twitter handle @PhoneDog_Noah,
76. See Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Plain-
tiff PhoneDog, LLC’s Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 12(b)(1) And for Failure to State A Claim Under Fed. R.
Civ. Proc. Rule 12(b)(6) at 2, PhoneDog v. Kravitz, 2011 WL 5415612 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 8, 2011) (No. C11-03474), 2011 WL 6955633 [hereinafter Defendant’s First
Reply] (noting specifically that Kravitz was not employee of PhoneDog, but was
instead independent contractor); see also Nov. 8, 2011 Opinion, supra note 11, at *1 R
(outlining background of case); Brian Ries, What Are Your Twitter Followers Worth,
and Who Owns Them?, THE DAILY BEAST, Dec. 28, 2011, available at http://www.the
dailybeast.com/articles/2011/12/28/what-are-your-twitter-followers-worth-and-
who-owns-them.html (reviewing factual history of suit).
77. See Plaintiff’s First Opposition, supra note 75, at 1 (discussing Kravitz’s em- R
ployment and responsibilities).
78. See id. (describing Kravitz’s role while working for PhoneDog); see also id.
(noting that Kravitz’s work was “transmitted to PhoneDog’s users via a variety of
mediums such as PhoneDog’s website and PhoneDog’s Twitter accounts.”).
79. Tom Klein, A Message to Our Fans About the Twitter Lawsuit, PHONEDOG ME-
DIA (Jan. 3, 2012, 5:00 PM) http://www.phonedog.com/2012/01/03/a-message-
to-our-fans-about-the-twitter-lawsuit/.  In addition, Klein addressed the pending
lawsuit, the facts leading up to the suit according to PhoneDog, and he thanked
the fans for their support and understanding. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id. (discussing growth of PhoneDog).
82. Id. (noting PhoneDog’s investment in Kravitz).
83. Id.  (stating that “[w]hat started out as a small part-time freelance oppor-
tunity grew into a very well paid career for Noah.”).
10
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though it is disputed whether Kravitz created the account himself
or if he was given use of the account after PhoneDog created it.84
In time, the Twitter handle @PhoneDog_Noah would attract some
17,000 followers.85  However, when Kravitz left the company, he
took his account with him, changing the Twitter handle to
@NoahKravitz.86
In its pleadings, PhoneDog alleges that it “granted [Kravitz]
use of a Twitter account . . . to use in connection with his work for
PhoneDog.”87  Additionally, PhoneDog alleges that upon his resig-
nation in October of 2010, the company requested that he relin-
quish use of the account.88  Kravitz, however, denied that he was
ever asked to abandon the account.89  In fact, Kravitz asserted that,
because the parties were on good terms at the time of his depar-
ture, PhoneDog “repeatedly asked him to send out tweets on its
behalf after he left . . . .”90
There is, additionally, an additional twist to the story.  Over the
five-year period that Kravitz worked for PhoneDog, he was compen-
sated in a number of different ways.91  Initially, Kravitz was paid for
84. See Plaintiff’s First Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 14 (“It should be R
noted that PhoneDog did not create the password to the account.  Kravitz initially
created the Account, including creating the Account’s password.”). But see First
Amended Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief; Misappropriation of
Trade Secrets; Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage;
Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage; and Conversion ¶
18, PhoneDog v. Kravitz, 2011 WL 5415612 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) (No. 3:11-cv-
03474-MEJ), 2011 WL 6955632 [hereinafter First Amended Complaint] (“As an
agent of PhoneDog, [Kravitz] was given use of and maintained the Twitter account
‘@PhoneDog_Noah.’”).
85. See Ries, supra note 76 (indicating that Kravitz’s 17,000 followers consisted R
of “friends, sources, colleagues, and readers, all interested in his particular blend
of tech opinion and general insight on life on the West Coast.”).
86. See id. (discussing change in Kravitz’s twitter handle).
87. See Plaintiff’s First Opposition, supra note 75, at 1 (discussing nature of R
Twitter account).
88. See Nov. 8, 2011 Opinion, supra note 11, at *1 (discussing allegations R
made by PhoneDog).
89. See Defendant’s First Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 2 (responding to R
PhoneDog’s allegations).
90. Id.; see also Biggs, supra note 14 (“PhoneDog told him he could keep his R
Twitter account in exchange for posting occasionally.”).  Further, Biggs quotes
Kravitz as saying that the company asked him to “tweet on their behalf from time
to time and I said sure, as we were parting on good terms.” Id. But see Plaintiff’s
First Opposition, supra note 75, at 5 (“[C]ontrary to the agreement between R
PhoneDog and Defendant that the Account was to be used for the benefit of
PhoneDog, Defendant failed to respond to requests from PhoneDog to tweet and
submit content to the Account promoting PhoneDog and instead used the Ac-
count to promote himself and TechnoBuffalo, a competitor of PhoneDog.”).
91. See Defendant’s First Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 1 (detailing vari- R
ous forms of compensation).
11
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each individual article that he wrote, then he was given a monthly
fee for his work, and finally he received a percentage of company
revenue and profits in exchange for his work.92  In 2010, however, a
dispute arose between Kravitz and the company, as Kravitz was al-
legedly owed “substantial unpaid wages and profits.”93  According
to Kravitz’s initial motion to dismiss in the present case, he at-
tempted to “resolve the dispute informally.”94  However, his efforts
were unsuccessful, prompting him to file suit in the California Su-
perior Court in Alameda County on June 8, 2011.95
According to Kravitz, the present case brought by PhoneDog
surrounding the Twitter account is in retaliation for the suit he
commenced.96  Specifically, Kravitz argues that PhoneDog has as-
serted four claims based on California law and an amount in con-
troversy in excess of $75,000 in an effort to have his pending suit
disrupted and removed to federal court.97  According to Kravitz,
this “constitutes improper forum shopping.”98  While these facts
add intrigue and complexity to the story, discussion of Kravitz’s
pending suit for back pay and retaliatory lawsuits are outside the
scope of this article.
B. Procedural History
On July 15, 2011, PhoneDog filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California against
Kravitz.99  Specifically, PhoneDog brought four claims against Kra-
vitz under California law: (1) misappropriation of trade secrets; (2)
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; (3)
92. See id. (expanding on forms of compensation).
93. Id.; see also Biggs, supra note 14 (describing Kravitz’s “claim to 15 percent R
of the site’s gross advertising revenue because of his position as a vested partner, as
well as back pay related to his position as a video reviewer and blogger for the
site.”).
94. Defendant’s First Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 1. R
95. See id. (discussing pending state litigation).
96. See id. at 2 (noting timing of PhoneDog’s Complaint and its lack of griev-
ances prior to Kravitz’s suit).  Additionally, Kravitz asserts that PhoneDog raised
four claims, all based on California law, in an effort to impede the progress of the
litigation in state court and gain subject matter jurisdiction for federal court. Id.;
see also Biggs, supra note 14 (discussing Kravitz’s pending litigation in California R
and his assertion of retaliation).
97. See Defendant’s First Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 1 (“PhoneDog R
only now raises the meritless and unsupported issues in this suit for the first time as
an attempt to prevent the Superior Court action from proceeding.”).
98. Id. (discussing PhoneDog’s claims).
99. See Nov. 8, 2011 Opinion, supra note 11, at *1 (discussing commencement R
of suit).  For the factual background of PhoneDog v. Kravitz, see supra notes 70-98 R
and accompanying text.
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negligent interference with prospective economic advantage; and
(4) conversion.100  In response to this Complaint, Kravitz filed a
motion to dismiss the suit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and to Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.101
In an Opinion dated November 8, 2011, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California, per Chief Judge
Maria Elena James, addressed PhoneDog’s claims and Kravitz’s mo-
tion to dismiss.102  The court denied Kravitz’s motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.103  The court opined that be-
cause “whether the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied
in this case is intertwined with factual and legal issues raised by
Phonedog’s claims . . . the issue cannot be resolved until summary
judgment on a fully developed evidentiary record.”104
Additionally, in the November 8 opinion, the court granted in
part and denied in part Kravitz’s motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim.105  Specifically, the court preserved PhoneDog’s
claims of misappropriation of trade secrets and conversion.106
PhoneDog’s claims of intentional interference with prospective eco-
nomic advantage and negligent interference with prospective eco-
nomic advantage claims, however, were dismissed without
prejudice.107  In doing so, the court said that PhoneDog had not
sufficiently alleged economic relationships with third parties.108
100. See Nov. 8, 2011 Opinion, supra note 11, at *1 (listing claims brought by R
PhoneDog).
101. See id. at *1-2 (noting Defendant’s response); Defendant’s First Motion
to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 2 (responding to PhoneDog’s allegations). R
102. See Nov. 8, 2011 Opinion, supra note 11, at *1 (denying Kravitz’s R
12(b)(1) motion and granting in part and denying in part his 12(b)(6) motion).
103. See id. at *5 (denying motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction).
104. Id. (discussing the court’s opinion).  For further discussion of the court’s
denial of Kravitz’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, see infra
notes 115–145 and accompanying text. R
105. See Nov. 8, 2011 Opinion, supra note 11, at *5-10 (granting Kravitz’s mo- R
tion to dismiss PhoneDog’s claims for intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage and negligent interference with prospective economic advan-
tage while denying his motion to dismiss claims of misappropriation of trade
secrets and conversion).
106. See id. (ruling on motion).
107. See id. (granting motion to dismiss both interference with prospective
economic advantage claims with leave to amend).
108. See id. at *8 (noting that “it is unclear who the ‘users’ are,. [sic] i.e.,
whether they are the 17,000 Account followers, consumers accessing PhoneDog’s
website, or some other individuals, and what the nature of PhoneDog’s purported
economic relationship is with these users.”).
13
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Further, PhoneDog had not sufficiently alleged “actual disruption
of the relationship between [PhoneDog] and its users and eco-
nomic harm caused by Mr. Kravitz’s actions.”109
PhoneDog was afforded leave to amend these two claims, and
subsequently filed its first amended complaint on November 29,
2011.110  In response, Kravitz filed a motion to dismiss the two
claims for interference with prospective economic advantage.111  In
a January 30, 2012 opinion, the court denied Kravitz’s motion to
dismiss on both counts.112  In so holding, the court recognized that
PhoneDog’s first amended complaint cured the deficiencies pre-
sent in the initial complaint.113  All four of PhoneDog’s claims will
be analyzed in Part IV of this Comment.114
As noted above, the court denied Kravitz’s motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.115  “Federal courts are courts
of limited jurisdiction,” possessing only that power authorized by
109. See id. (dismissing PhoneDog’s claim because it failed to sufficiently al-
lege which economic relationships were actually disrupted by Kravitz’s alleged
conduct.”).
110. See generally First Amended Complaint, supra note 84; see also Jan. 3, 2012 R
Opinion, supra note 11, at *1 (noting November 8 disposition and PhoneDog’s R
amended complaint).
111. See generally Defendant’s Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Plain-
tiff PhoneDog, LLC’s Second and Third Claims for Relief in the First Amended
Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 12(b)(6); Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support Thereof, PhoneDog v. Kravitz, 2011 WL 5415612 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) (No. C11-03474), 2011 WL 6955635 [hereinafter Defendant’s
Second Motion to Dismiss] (moving for dismissal for failure to state a claim).
112. See Jan. 30, 2012 Opinion, supra note 11, at *2 (denying Kravitz’s motion R
to dismiss on both claims).
113. See id. at *1 (“PhoneDog’s [first amended complaint] clarified that it had
economic relationships with (1) the approximately 17,000 followers of the Twitter
account at issue; (2) its current and prospective advertisers; and (3) CNBC and
Fox News, and that each of these economic relationships were actually disrupted
by Kravitz’s conduct.”); see also First Amended Complaint, supra note 84 ¶ 33 (al- R
leging relationship with approximately 17,000 followers of Twitter account and
“existing and prospective advertisers who pay for ad inventory on PhoneDog’s web-
site per 1000 pageviews”); id. ¶ 34 (alleging economic relationships with CNBC
and Fox News); id. ¶ 36 (stating that Kravitz’s “wrongful conduct was designed to
disrupt, and has in fact disrupted, as well as adversely affected, PhoneDog’s eco-
nomic relationships with the PhoneDog followers and prospective users of the Ac-
count, and PhoneDog’s existing and prospective advertisers who buy ad inventory
on PhoneDog’s website in that, as a result of Defendant’s conduct, there is de-
creased traffic to Defendant’s website through the Account, which in turn de-
creases the number of website pageviews and discourages advertisers from paying
for ad inventory on PhoneDog’s website.  Moreover, as a result of Defendant’s
wrongful conduct, PhoneDog no longer has contributing spots on [CNBC and Fox
News programs].”).
114. For analysis of PhoneDog’s claims against Kravitz moving forward, see
infra notes 146–236 and accompanying text. R
115. For a discussion of the court’s denial of Kravitz’s motion, see supra notes
103–104. R
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Article III of the United States Constitution and statutes enacted by
Congress thereto.116  Per 28 U.S.C. § 1331, Congress has conferred
upon federal courts jurisdiction to decide federal questions, i.e.,
cases or controversies arising under the Constitution and laws of
the United States.117  Additionally, federal courts have jurisdiction
over cases or controversies between citizens of different states,
known as diversity jurisdiction, as granted by Congress in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332.118  The party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of prov-
ing that jurisdiction is proper.119
Unlike federal question jurisdiction, where the subject matter
of the underlying suit determines if jurisdiction is proper, the par-
ties involved in the suit are determinative of diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction.120  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, federal diversity juris-
diction exists only in “civil actions where the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and cost,
and is between – (1) citizens of different States . . . .”121
There is no dispute that PhoneDog and Kravitz are citizens of
different states.122  However, Kravitz asserts that PhoneDog has not
met the burden of establishing that the amount in controversy is
satisfied.123  PhoneDog asserts that industry standards value each
follower at $2.50 per month.124  Accordingly, 17,000 followers is
equal to $42,500 in damages for each of the eight months that Kra-
vitz continued his use of the Twitter account, totaling $340,000 in
damages at the time of filing.125
Kravitz’s challenge of the amount in controversy is based on
the contention that “PhoneDog cannot establish that it is entitled
to any monetary recovery because it does not have competent proof
116. Craig A. Smith, Civil Procedure, LAWSCHOOLHELP.COM, http://www.west.
net/~smith/smjuris.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2012).
117. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (defining federal question jurisdiction).
118. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (defining diversity of citizenship jurisdiction)
119. See Smith, supra note 116 (discussing diversity jurisdiction). R
120. See id. (discussing diversity jurisdiction).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
122. See Nov. 8, 2011 Opinion, supra note 11, at *2 (noting that Kravitz ac- R
knowledges diversity of citizenship between parties); see also About Us, PHONEDOG
MEDIA, supra note 70 (noting that PhoneDog is South Carolina company); Defen- R
dant’s First Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84, at 4 (noting that PhoneDog is incor- R
porated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Mount Pleasant, South
Carolina).
123. See Defendant’s First Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 2-3 R
(“PhoneDog cannot establish an amount in controversy over $75,000 through
competent proof of damages as required by law.”).
124. See Nov. 8, 2011 Opinion, supra note 11, at *3 (discussing PhoneDog’s R
calculation of damages).
125. See id. (outlining calculation of alleged damages).
15
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that it has ownership or right to possession over the Account or the
followers.”126  Kravitz offers a number of arguments in support of
this claim.127  First, Kravitz contends that the Twitter account at is-
sue, like “all Twitter accounts are . . . the exclusive property of Twit-
ter and its licensors, not PhoneDog.”128  Next, Kravitz argues that
Twitter followers have the discretion to follow or unfollow accounts
without the permission of the handle user.129  Along these lines,
Kravitz makes the argument that the value of a Twitter account re-
ally “comes from . . . efforts in posting tweets and [an] individual’s
interest in following . . . not from the account itself.”130  Lastly, Kra-
vitz makes the point that followers are humans and that since the
passing of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution, “humans in the United States are not ‘property’ and cannot
be owned.”131
126. Defendant’s First Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 9. R
127. See id. at 9-12 (arguing that all Twitter accounts are exclusive property of
Twitter, that Twitter account followers are humans and cannot be property or
owned, that there is no evidence that Twitter accounts have any monetary value,
and that PhoneDog’s valuation methodology is flawed); see also id. at 10 (“To date,
the industry precedent has been that absent an agreement prohibiting any em-
ployee from doing so, after an employee leaves an employer, they are free to
charge [sic] their Twitter handle.”).
128. Id. at 9; see also Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/tos (June
25, 2012) (“All right, title, and interest in and to the Services (excluding Content
provided by users) are and will remain the exclusive property of Twitter and its
licensors.”).
129. See Defendant’s First Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 9 (noting dis- R
cretion each follower possesses). But see Account Settings, TWITTER, https://twit-
ter.com/account/settings (authorizing Twitter users to protect their tweets).
Twitter privacy settings allow users to set their accounts as private, which enables
users to approve followers and keep their Tweets from the public. Id.  “Protect
your Tweets if you don’t want them to be public.  Approve who can follow you and
keep your Tweets out of search results.” Id.  On Twitter’s ‘Help Center’ page, pri-
vacy settings are explained:
When you sign up for Twitter, you have the option of keeping your
Tweets public (the default account setting) or protecting your Tweets.
Accounts with public Tweets have profile pages that are visible to every-
one.  Accounts with protected Tweets require manual approval of each
and every person who may view that account’s Tweets.  Only approved
followers can view Tweets made on these accounts.
About Public and Protected Tweets, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/groups/31-
twitter-basics/topics/107-my-profile-account-settings/articles/14016-about-public-
and-protected-tweets (last visited Nov. 9, 2012).
130. Lauren Dugan, How Much Is A Twitter Follower Worth? $2.50 Per Month
According To One Company’s Lawsuit, ALLTWITTER (Nov. 14, 2011, 12:35 PM), http:/
/www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/twitter-follower-worth_b15763.
131. Defendant’s First Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 3; see also U.S. R
CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”).
16
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PhoneDog will face an uphill battle trying to prove that the
amount in controversy exceeds the required $75,000.132  PhoneDog
alleges that, per industry standards, each follower is worth $2.50 per
month.133  However, as Kravitz vehemently contests, “PhoneDog
neither states that there is an actual recognized method to measure
the value of a Twitter ‘account’, nor does it allege that its method of
calculating the value of the Account is in accordance with ‘industry
standard.’”134
Kravitz is not the only one questioning how PhoneDog calcu-
lated their damages, with specific reference to the valuation of fol-
lowers at $2.50 per month.135  Some have argued that there are
many factors that should be considered when valuing a Twitter ac-
count, including more than just the number of followers.136  In fact,
there are reports circulating the web indicating that a Twitter fol-
lower may be worth less than a penny.137  Additionally, it is possible
132. See Biggs, supra note 14 (quoting Sree Sreenivasan, professor at Colum- R
bia Journalism School: “The value of the individual users is very hard to quantify.
It’s dangerous to overestimate the value of an account to an organization and un-
derestimate what it means for an individual.”); see also Sree Sreenivasan, COLUM.
JOURNALISM SCH., http://www.journalism.columbia.edu/profile/65-sree-
sreenivasan/10 (providing profession and biographical information).
133. See generally Nov. 8, 2011 Opinion, supra note 11 (noting PhoneDog’s R
request for damages).
134. See Defendant’s First Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71, at *10 (noting R
additionally that “PhoneDog also does not state how ProneDog [sic] profits off the
Account or how an account can have any real value, especially when users are
strictly prohibited from selling it or using for business purposes not specifically
authorized by Twitter.”); see also Lauren Campbell, How Much is a Twitter Account
Worth? (And Is It Enough to Keep You in Federal Court?), CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT,
(Feb. 16, 2012) http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2012/how-much-twitter-ac-
count-worth-and-it-enough-keep-you-federal-court (“PhoneDog did not, however,
define the ‘industry standards’ used to arrive at this amount, and it provided no
further support for the $2.50-per-follower-per-month figure.”).
135. See Jeff Roberts, Can a Twitter Account be a Company Trade Secret?, PAIDCON-
TENT.ORG, http://paidcontent.org/article/419-can-a-twitter-account-be-a-company-
trade-secret/ (noting that PhoneDog’s “ ‘industry standard’ metric may . . . be a
touch optimistic”).
136. See Campbell, supra note 134 (“It is going to be very hard for PhoneDog R
to establish accurate damages.  In order to answer the question ‘How much is the
Twitter account worth?’, a multitude of factors must be considered, not just the
number of followers.  If I were suggesting an accurate measurement, I might look
at number of followers combined with the average tweets, click-thrus, retweets,
mentions, etc., per day.  And then create a complicated algorithm to put it in dol-
lar terms.  This starts, at least, to give a more accurate picture of how and how
often people actually interact with your Twitter account, which is indicative of its
value.”).
137. See Jordan McCollum, What Are Twitter Followers Worth? <1¢, MARKETING
PILGRIM (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.marketingpilgrim.com/2010/02/twitter-fol-
lowers-worth-1-cent.html (“[I]t turns out those followers are way overpriced—the
going rate on eBay is less than 1¢ per follower.”).
17
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to purchase Twitter followers on eBay for “less than a penny
each.”138
There are a number of websites that claim to value Twitter ac-
counts.139  There is very little information about how these websites
actually calculate the value of a Twitter account, and each website
may value an individual account differently.140  Under PhoneDog’s
valuation, Kravitz’s Twitter account with approximately 17,000 fol-
lowers would be worth $42,500 per month.  But, if you apply
PhoneDog’s value-per-follower calculation to other Twitter ac-
counts, the estimated values would be astronomical.141  For exam-
ple, Lady Gaga’s Twitter account, with more than twelve million
followers, would be valued at $30 million per month or $3.6 billion
per year.142  “This would make @ladygaga as profitable as the entire
online dating industry.”143
In the end, it is not clear how the Court will rule.  At this stage,
PhoneDog has alleged enough for the suit to go forward, but there
is still much to be uncovered during discovery.144  However, many
of the facts that Kravitz alleges—specifically that he was an indepen-
dent contractor as opposed to an employee and that he personally
created the account—if true, could render this case less telling than
initially anticipated.145
138. Erick Schonfeld, On eBay, Twitter Followers are Worth Less Than a Penny
Each, TECH CRUNCH (Jan. 31, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/01/31/twitter-
followers-ebay-penny/. But see id. (“You are not actually buying followers outright
(Twitter doesn’t allow people to transfer their followers), but rather services which
‘guarantee’ getting your account up to the promised number of followers through
‘proven and safe methods.’  Some even only count reciprocal followers (followers
who follow back).”).
139. See HOW MUCH IS YOUR TWITTER ACCOUNT WORTH?, http://whatsmytwit-
teraccountworth.com/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2012) (displaying worth of Twitter ac-
counts entered into inquiry field); TWEET VALUE, http://tweetvalue.com/ (last
visited Mar. 21, 2012) (displaying same); TWALUE, http://www.twalue.com/ (last
visited Mar. 21, 2012) (displaying same).
140. See TWEET VALUE, supra note 139 (“This service was created by the Swed- R
ish entrepreneur and developer Jonas Lejon.  The value is calculated with a Ph.D
algoritm [sic] that is based on the public information available on your Twitter
profile.  uuhm.  not really :-).”).




144. See Nov. 8, 2011 Opinion, supra note 11, at *5 (noting that “the issue R
cannot be resolved until summary judgment on a fully developed evidentiary
record.”).
145. See Qualters, supra note 70 (quoting Eric Goldman, associate professor at R
Santa Clara University School of Law: “At most, it’s going to answer questions
about how the law applies to contractors.”).  Professor Goldman is also the director
of the school’s High Tech Law Institute.  See Eric Goldman, SANTA CLARA LAW,
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IV. #ANALYSIS
“zpower: noahkravitz is it true that following you is a misdemeanor in the
state of california?”146
—@noahkravitz
A. Misappropriation of Trade Secrets
In California, a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets is
governed by California’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Cal. Civ. Code
Section 3426 et seq., (“CUTSA”).147  To properly state a cause of
action for misappropriation of trade secrets, a plaintiff must plead
two primary elements: (1) the existence of a trade secret, and (2)
misappropriation of the trade secret.148
1. Trade Secrets
Section 3526.1(d) of CUTSA defines a “trade secret” as
information . . . that . . . derives independent economic
value, actual or potential, from not being generally known
to the public or to other persons who can obtain eco-
nomic value from its disclosure or use; and . . . is the sub-
ject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances
to maintain its secrecy.149
In their initial complaint, PhoneDog alleged that their confidential
information includes the passwords to Twitter accounts used by
PhoneDog employees using the @PhoneDog_NAME handle.150
Bolstering this argument, PhoneDog stated that it uses social me-
dia, including Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, in an effort to pro-
http://law.scu.edu/faculty/profile/goldman-eric.cfm (displaying faculty profile
and biography of Professor Goldman); Biography, ERIC GOLDMAN, http://
www.ericgoldman.org/biography.html (displaying biography of Professor
Goldman).
146. Noah Kravitz, Posting of @noahkravitz to Twitter (retweeting @zpower)
(Dec. 27, 2011, 1:13 PM) available at https://twitter.com/noahkravitz/status/1517
27294845681664/.
147. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1 (West ) (providing definitions for misappro-
priation of trade secrets claim); see also id. § 3426 (“This title may be cited as the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act.”).
148. See id. (noting elements of misappropriation of trade secrets claim).
149. Id. § 3426.1(b) (defining “trade secret”).
150. See Nov. 8, 2011 Opinion, supra note 11, at *1 (“According to PhoneDog, R
all @PhoneDog_Name Twitter accounts used by its employees, as well as the pass-
words to such accounts, constitute proprietary, confidential information.”); First
Amended Complaint, supra note 84 ¶ 15 (alleging that “confidential information R
includes, but is not limited to . . . the passwords to PhoneDog’s Twitter accounts,
including all @PhoneDog_NAME Twitter accounts used by PhoneDog’s agents.”).
19
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mote the website and generate pageviews.151  Specifically,
PhoneDog alleges that the password to Kravitz’s account derives ac-
tual and potential independent economic value for Kravitz.152
PhoneDog essentially frames Twitter followers as a customer list, al-
leging that Kravitz used the account after his departure “with the
intent and desire to further his career, to use and profit from such
information, [and] to call on and solicit the very same users of
PhoneDog’s services. . . .”153
In response, Kravitz argued that the password to his Twitter
account does not fall within the definition of a trade secret under
the CUTSA.154  First, Kravitz argues that the information that
PhoneDog alleges is a trade secret does not fit the definition of a
trade secret under the CUTSA because Twitter follower informa-
tion is public.155  Second, Kravitz alleges that PhoneDog “did not
treat the information as a trade secret or take adequate steps to
protect it.”156
151. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 84 ¶¶ 10-11 (discussing use of R
social media sites and explaining that pageviews generate income for PhoneDog
through advertisements).
152. See id. ¶ 22 (“[Kravitz’s] use of the Account and communication with
PhoneDog’s Followers is and was done in an attempt to market and advertise his
services and the services of his [new] employer.”); see also Qualters, supra note 70 R
(noting same PhoneDog claim).
153. First Amended Complaint, supra note 84 ¶ 27; see also Jane Genova, R
Phonedog v. Noah Kravitz: Protecting IP, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Feb. 3, 2012), http://
beta.fool.com/janegenova/2012/02/03/phonedog-v-noah-kravitz-protecting-ip/
1617/ (suggesting that PhoneDog is “framing the entity as a type of ‘customer
list.’”).
154. See Defendant’s First Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 15 R
(“[P]asswords to Twitter accounts do not derive any actual or potential indepen-
dent economic value under the UTSA”); Nov. 8, 2011 Opinion, supra note 11, at *6 R
(acknowledging Kravitz’s argument that “the identity of the Account followers and
the ‘password’ to the Account which PhoneDog alleges were misappropriated by
Kravitz are not a ‘trade secret’ within the meaning of the [CUSTA].”).
155. See Defendant’s First Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 14 (“The fol- R
lowers of the Account are not secret because they are and have been publicly avail-
able for all to see at all times.”); see also PhoneDog v. Kravitz, TRADE SECRETS INST.,
http://tsi.brooklaw.edu/cases/phonedog-v-kravitz (noting Kravitz’s argument in
motion to dismiss for failure to state claim that public information such as follow-
ers of Twitter account cannot be trade secrets).
156. See PhoneDog v. Kravitz, TRADE SECRETS INST., supra note 155; see also De- R
fendant’s First Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 15-16 (noting that PhoneDog R
did not create account’s password and “did not make any reasonable effort to
maintain the secrecy of the password to the Account which it now claims to be a
trade secret.”).  Kravitz states that there was no written agreement “with respect to
the proprietary or confidentiality of the Twitter passwords.” Id.  Further, employ-
ees were not required to “sign any non-disclosure or confidential agreement with
respect to the Twitter accounts and passwords to maintain secrecy.” Id.  But see
First Amended Complaint, supra note 84 ¶ 14 (“PhoneDog has taken and contin- R
ues to take reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of this proprietary informa-
20
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In Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, the California Court of Appeals for the
First District discussed the issue of confidential customer lists con-
stituting trade secrets.157  In this case, the defendant resigned from
his position after working for the plaintiff for six years.158  Upon his
departure, he took with him the business cards of customers he had
acquired during his employment.159  After leaving the plaintiff’s
company, the defendant opened his own business in the same
field.160  Further, the defendant contacted many of the customers
that he had done work for while employed by the plaintiff.161  The
plaintiff filed suit after the defendants ignored a cease and desist
letter.162
The appellate court held that the customer list constituted a
trade secret as defined by the CUTSA.163  In so holding, the court
discussed the debate surrounding free competition in business and
the protection of work product.164  The court noted that when the
California Legislature enacted the CUTSA, it was added to the list
of states “which have determined that the right of free competition
does not include the right to use confidential work product of
others.”165
The court held that in order for confidential information to
have independent economic value such that it qualifies as a trade
secret, “the secrecy of this information [must] provide[ ] a business
with a ‘substantial business advantage.’”166  Additionally, the Court
noted that traditionally, courts are not likely to protect customer
lists “to the extent they embody information which is ‘readily ascer-
tion, including restricting access to, and distribution of, this confidential
information only to agents of PhoneDog who need this information to perform
services for PhoneDog.”).
157. See Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 736 (Ct. App. 1997) (dis-
cussing whether confidential customer lists are trade secrets).
158. See id. at 733 (outlining facts).
159. See id. (discussing facts).
160. See id. (explaining that defendant started his own company doing same
work as plaintiff’s company).
161. See id. (noting that business cards defendant took constituted approxi-
mately seventy-five to eighty percent of plaintiff’s customer base).
162. See id. (discussing factual background of case).
163. See id. at 734 (outlining court’s findings).
164. See id. at 734-736 (outlining enactment of CUTSA and discussing
debate).
165. See id. at 735 (noting that CUTSA meant that California does not allow
individuals to use others’ confidential work products).
166. See id. at 736 (citing Klamath-Orleans Lumber, Inc. v. Miller, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 118, 121 (Ct. App. 1978)).
21
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tainable’ through public sources, such as business directories.”167
Explaining that the business models at issue in the case were very
unique, the court held that the customer list had a value to the
defendants because it allowed them to solicit more effectively and
efficiently to the specific and unique customers that the plaintiff
had acquired over time.168
Kravitz claims that, unlike the customer list in Morlife, the fol-
lowers of his Twitter account “are and have been publicly available
for all to see at all times.”169  But this contention does not cover all
of the bases.  In order to access and take advantage of this customer
list, or the followers of his account, Kravitz must use the password to
access the account.170  Each time Kravitz has accessed the Twitter
account since his resignation from PhoneDog, he has used what
PhoneDog believes to be its trade secret in order to derive the ac-
tual or potential economic value from the account.171
Possibly fatal to PhoneDog’s claim is that Kravitz created the
account and the password to the account himself.172  Kravitz claims
that he created the account on his own initiative to promote his
freelance work, including the freelance work that he was doing for
PhoneDog.173  Additionally, Kravitz states that it was only after he
created his account and used it to promote PhoneDog’s website
that PhoneDog requested that its other employees do the same.174
167. See id. at 1521 (citing Am. Paper & Packaging Products, Inc. v. Kirgan,
228 Cal. Rptr. 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1986)).
168. See id. (“[Plaintiff] provides a relatively unusual roofing service, namely,
commercial roof repair and maintenance, as distinguished from replacement roof-
ing.”  Its customer list was “a compilation, developed over a period of years, of
names, addresses, and contact persons, containing pricing information and knowl-
edge about particular roofs and roofing needs of customers using its services: as
such, it has independent economic value.”).
169. See Defendant’s First Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 14; see also Sher- R
man, supra note 11 (noting that with rapid growth of internet, “the universe of R
trade secret information is becoming smaller.  This would seem especially true in
the case of Twitter followers who are on a public list that can be viewed by anyone
with a Twitter account.”).
170. For information on how Twitter works, see supra notes 23-64 and accom- R
panying text.
171. For an explanation of PhoneDog’s allegations of the potential and actual
economic value that Kravitz derives from use of the Twitter account, see supra note
153. R
172. See Defendant’s First Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 15 (“It should R
be noted that PhoneDog did not create the password to the Account.  Kravitz ini-
tially created the Account, including creating the Account’s password.”).
173. See Defendant’s First Reply, supra note 76, at 3 (“Kravitz created the Ac- R
count for his own personal use and to promote his freelance work, including free-
lance projects for PhoneDog.”).
174. See id. at 2 (“[I]t was after Kravitz created the Twitter account . . . on his
own initiative for personal and work-related purposes did PhoneDog then decided
22
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With these facts in mind, it is hard to imagine that PhoneDog is
entitled to the allegedly confidential password information.175
PhoneDog’s claim of a trade secret, therefore, seems tenuous at
best.176
2. Misappropriation
The entire misappropriation claim will rest on whether
PhoneDog can prove that the password to the account in fact con-
stitutes a trade secret.177  Assuming, arguendo, that PhoneDog is
able to establish a trade secret, there are additional hurdles to over-
come in order to prevail on the misappropriation of trade secrets
claim.178  Under the CUTSA, misappropriation means the
following:
(1) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person
who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret
was acquired by improper means; or
(2) Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without
express or implied consent by a person who:
(A) Used improper means to acquire knowledge of
the trade secret; or
(B) At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had rea-
son to know that his or her knowledge of the
trade secret was:
(i) Derived from or through a person who had
utilized improper means to acquire it;
(ii) Acquired under circumstances giving rise to
a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use;
or
(iii) Derived from or through a person who
owed a duty to the person seeking relief to
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
[sic] request its ‘employees’ use their existing Twitter accounts or create such ac-
counts for similar reasons.”).
175. See Messieh, supra note 11 (“The problem with the PhoneDog vs. Noah R
Kravitz case is that, while the Twitter account bore the PhoneDog name, and Kra-
vitz’s position as editor-in-chief no doubt earned him more exposure, the account
was maintained entirely by Kravitz personally.”).
176. For a further discussion of PhoneDog’s claim of trade secret, see supra
notes 149-175 and accompanying text. R
177. For discussion of the elements of misappropriation of trade secrets
claim, see supra notes 147-148 and accompanying text. R
178. For the definition of “misappropriation” under CUTSA, see infra note
179 and accompanying text. R
23
Kolansky: Can we Really Ascribe a Dollar Amount to Interpersonal Communicat
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-1\VLS105.txt unknown Seq: 24 19-FEB-13 10:07
156 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20: p. 133
(C) Before a material change of his or her position,
knew or had reason to know that it was a trade
secret and that knowledge of it had been ac-
quired by accident or mistake.179
Working through the elements of misappropriation, it does not ap-
pear from the pleadings that any of Kravitz’s actions constitute
misappropriation.180
According to the pleadings, Kravitz’s actions did not violate
section 3426.1(b)(1).181  Specifically, Kravitz created the account
and the password himself, so he did not acquire it by improper
means.182  Section 3426.1(a) states, “improper means includes
theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a
breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through elec-
tronic or other means.”183  Kravitz allegedly created the account
and password himself, which renders the use of the account after
his resignation outside the scope of this provision.184
The CUTSA also provides that misappropriation can include
“use of a trade secret of another without express or implied con-
sent.”185  PhoneDog is unclear as to whether it requested that Kra-
vitz stop using the account upon his departure from the
company.186  Kravitz, however, claims that that PhoneDog made no
request for him to stop using the account and that, in fact,
PhoneDog requested that he continue to use the account to pro-
mote their website.187  Further, none of Kravitz’s alleged actions fall
179. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(b) (2012).
180. For discussion of the facts, see supra notes 70-98 and accompanying text. R
181. For allegations that Kravitz created the account and password, see supra
note 84 and accompanying text. R
182. See id.
183. § 3426.1(a).
184. For a discussion of the account creation, see supra notes 69-96 and ac-
companying text.
185. § 3426.1(b)(2).
186. Compare Nov. 8, 2011 Opinion, supra note 11, at *1 (explaining that at R
time Kravitz left company, “PhoneDog requested that he relinquish use of the
Twitter account”), with Plaintiff’s First Opposition, supra note 75, at 5 (“[C]ontrary R
to the agreement between PhoneDog and Defendant that the Account was to be
used for the benefit of PhoneDog, Defendant failed to respond to requests from
PhoneDog to tweet and submit content to the Account promoting PhoneDog and
instead used the Account to promote himself and TechnoBuffalo, a competitor of
PhoneDog.”).
187. See Defendant’s First Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 2 (“PhoneDog R
never expressed any disapproval of Kravitz’s use of the Account at issue, and in fact
repeatedly asked him to send out tweets on its behalf after he left employment with
PhoneDog in October 2010.”).
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within the remaining elements of Section 3426.1(b)(2).188  Since
there was no formal agreement between the parties about Kravitz’s
use of the account after his departure, with the exception of a possi-
ble request by PhoneDog that he continue to promote their web-
site, it is unlikely that PhoneDog will prevail under the consent
provision.189
B. Intentional Interference with Prospective
Economic Advantage
PhoneDog’s second claim for relief is for intentional interfer-
ence with prospective economic advantage.190  As noted by Kravitz
in his August 4, 2011 motion for summary judgment, “the tort of
intentional or negligent interference with prospective economic ad-
vantage imposes liability for improper methods of disrupting or di-
verting the business relationship of another which fall outside the
boundaries of fair competition.”191
In Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., the Supreme Court
of California compiled and summarized the elements of the tort as:
(1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and
some third party, with the probability of future economic
benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of
the relationship; (3) intentional acts on the part of the
defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual
188. See § 3426.1(b)(2)(A)-(C) (“(2) Disclosure or use of a trade secret of
another without express or implied consent by a person who: (A) Used improper
means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or (B) At the time of disclosure or
use, knew or had reason to know that his or her knowledge of the trade secret was:
(i) Derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire
it; (ii) Acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or
limit its use; or (iii) Derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the
person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (C) Before a mate-
rial change of his or her position, knew or had reason to know that it was a trade
secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake.”).
189. For a discussion of the consent provision, see supra notes 185-188 and R
accompanying text.
190. See generally Nov. 8, 2011 Opinion, supra note 11 (acknowledging and R
ruling on PhoneDog’s claim of intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage).
191. Defendant’s First Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 17 (quoting Set- R
timo Assocs. v. Environ Sys., Inc., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 757, 758 (Ct. App. 1993)).  The
Settimo court stated that the tort of intentional or negligent interference with pro-
spective economic advantage “is premised upon the principle [that] ‘[e]veryone
has the right to establish and conduct a lawful business and is entitled to the pro-
tection of organized society, through its courts, whenever that right is unlawfully
invaded.’” Settimo, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758 (internal citations omitted) (quoting
Inst. of Veterinary Pathology, Inc. v. Cal. Health Labs., Inc., 172 Cal. Rptr. 74, 81-
82 (Ct. App. 1981)).
25
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disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to
the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the
defendant.192
PhoneDog claims to have economic relationships with three
different third parties: (1) the followers of the Twitter account; (2)
current and prospective advertisers; and (3) CNBC and Fox
News.193  Kravitz’s initial motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim on this count rested primarily on his contention that
PhoneDog had not sufficiently alleged the existence of any eco-
nomic relationship between PhoneDog and the followers of the dis-
puted Twitter account.194  While PhoneDog asserted that it “has
had and continues to enjoy relationships with existing and prospec-
tive users of its mobile news and review services,” the Court was un-
satisfied and granted Kravitz’s motion to dismiss the claim.195  On
this point, the Court stated that PhoneDog’s allegations were un-
clear as to “who the ‘users’ are,. [sic] i.e., whether they are the
17,000 Account followers, consumers accessing PhoneDog’s web-
site, or some other individuals, and what the nature of PhoneDog’s
purported economic relationship is with these users.”196
To overcome the motion for summary judgment, PhoneDog
cured the above deficiencies in its first amended complaint.197  In
particular, PhoneDog alleged that it had actual economic relation-
ships with the 17,000 followers of the Twitter account, with current
and prospective advertisers, and with CNBC and Fox News.198  Kra-
192. Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 29, 45 (Ct.
App. 2003) (quoting Westside Ctr. Assocs. v. Safeway Stores 23, Inc. 49 Cal. Rptr.
2d 793, 802 (Ct. App. 1996)); see also Nov. 8, 2011 Opinion, supra note 11, at *7 R
(citing CRST Van Expedited v. Werner Enter., Inc., 479 F.3d 1099, 1108 (9th Cir.
2007)) (stating what plaintiff must establish under claim for intentional interfer-
ence with prospective economic advantage).
193. First Amended Complaint, supra note 84 ¶¶ 19, 33, 34 (listing economic R
relationships).
194. Defendant’s First Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 18 (“PhoneDog R
did not allege that there was an actual economic relationship with any Twitter
followers.”).
195. See Plaintiff’s First Opposition, supra note 75, at 13; see also Nov. 8, 2011 R
Opinion, supra note 11, at *8 (noting lack of clarity and conclusory nature of R
PhoneDog’s pleading and granting motion to dismiss claim).
196. Nov. 8, 2011 Opinion, supra note 11, at *8. R
197. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 84 ¶¶ 19, 33, 34 (stating eco- R
nomic relationships existed with 17,000 followers of Twitter account, current and
prospective advertisers, and CNBC and Fox News).
198. See id. (outlining economic relationships).
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vitz still argued that PhoneDog’s pleadings were insufficient to
demonstrate proper economic relationships.199
The Court held that, while Kravitz contested all three alleged
economic relationships asserted by PhoneDog, only one of these
relationships had to actually meet the elements of the tort for the
claim to move forward.200  The Court stated that the relationship
between PhoneDog and its current and prospective advertisers did
in fact meet each element of the claim.201
This ruling rested on the allegations made by PhoneDog that
“[a] significant source of PhoneDog’s income derives from adver-
tisements being sold on its website.  PhoneDog’s advertisers pay for
ad inventory on PhoneDog’s website for every 1000 pageviews gen-
erated from users visiting PhoneDog’s website.”202  In so holding,
the Court seems to be approving of a broad theory of economic
interference.203  Specifically, it seems that this theory “would sweep
up a lot of otherwise innocent conduct.”204
Of the three economic relationships asserted by PhoneDog,
the relationship with prospective advertisers seems like the relation-
ship most likely to succeed under this claim.205  Based on
PhoneDog’s factual allegations pertaining to the income it derives
199. See Defendant’s Second Motion to Dismiss, supra note 111, at 7 R
(“PhoneDog’s second claim for relief must be dismissed because the [First
Amended Complaint] still fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.”).
200. See Jan. 30, 2012 Opinion, supra note 11, at *1 (“For PhoneDog to have R
properly alleged its second claim, only one of the [stated] economic relationships
has to meet the elements of the tort.”).
201. See id. (discussing explicit allegations in PhoneDog’s First Amended
Complaint regarding decreased traffic to PhoneDog website that discourages ad-
vertisers from buying ad space on website). But see id. n.2 (“Kravitz’s concerns that
the nature of PhoneDog’s relationships with both the Twitter followers as well as
CNBC and Fox News are not ‘economical’ are more properly addressed by a mo-
tion for partial summary judgment rather than a motion to dismiss, particularly
where there is another economic relationship being pled by PhoneDog (i.e., the
current advertisers).”).
202. First Amended Complaint, supra note 84 ¶ 10. But see Nichole Kelly, R
2011 Trending Topic: Social Media ROI, SOCIAL MEDIA EXPLORER (Apr. 21, 2011),
http://www.socialmediaexplorer.com/social-media-measurement/social-media-
roi/ (submitting that most companies experience negative economic returns on
investment into social media marketing).
203. See Venkat Balasubramani, Court Denies Kravitz’s Motion to Dismiss
PhoneDog’s Amended Claims—PhoneDog v. Kravitz, TECH. & MKTG. LAW BLOG (Jan.
31, 2012), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/01/court_denies_kr.htm
(noting court’s statement that this is sufficient at pleading stage).
204. Id.
205. See Jan. 30, 2012 Opinion, supra note 11, at *1 (stating that alleged rela- R
tionship between PhoneDog and current and prospective advertisers suffices for
claim).
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from advertisements and how traffic on the website plays a direct
role in the amount of advertisements that PhoneDog sells, it seems
straightforward enough to view this as an economic relationship to
satisfy the first element of the claim.206  Further, the fact that Kra-
vitz previously used the Twitter account in a manner that en-
couraged and directed traffic to the site, and no longer does, is an
important factor regarding the harm suffered by PhoneDog.207
In reference to PhoneDog’s alleged economic relationship
with the followers and prospective users of the Twitter account, Kra-
vitz argues that it is unclear what exactly the purported economic
relationship is.208  While PhoneDog’s economic relationships with
its current and future advertisers seem clear enough, its purported
economic relationships with the followers of the Twitter account
and with CNBC and Fox News are more tenuous.209  PhoneDog has
alleged no facts that support the claim that there was an economic
relationship between it and the Twitter followers or between it and
CNBC and Fox News.210
PhoneDog would be better off asserting that these two relation-
ships, though not economical in a way that meets the elements of
the claim, factor into the overall calculus of lost revenue in the
form of lost advertisement sales.211  PhoneDog would have a strong
argument here, and potentially in other claims, if it asserts that Kra-
vitz’s actions in diverting followers from PhoneDog’s website re-
sulted in lost advertisement sales – not that PhoneDog had any
relationship with those followers.212  The same idea applies to
206. See id. (noting that, while claims seem weak, this alleged economic rela-
tionship is strongest).
207. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 84 ¶ 36 (“[A]s a result of [Kra- R
vitz’s] conduct, there is decreased traffic to [PhoneDog’s] website through the
Account, which in turn decreases the number of website pageviews and discour-
ages advertisers from paying for ad inventory on PhoneDog’s website.”).
208. See Jan. 30, 2012 Opinion, supra note 11, at *1 (noting Kravitz’s opposi- R
tion to purported economic relationship).
209. See Venkat Balasubramani, An Update on PhoneDog v. Kravitz, the Employee
Twitter Account Case, TECH. & MKTG. LAW BLOG (Jan. 11, 2012), http://blog.eric
goldman.org/archives/2012/01/an_update_on_th.htm (noting that PhoneDog’s
interference with economic advantage claims “look tenuous—especially the one
about the disruption of economic relationship between PhoneDog and the follow-
ers of Kravitz’s Twitter account.”).
210. See Defendant’s Second Motion to Dismiss, supra note 111, at 7 (respond- R
ing to plaintiff’s allegations).
211. See Jan 30, 2012 Opinion, supra note 11, at *1 (outlining court’s ap- R
proach to evaluating economic interference).
212. For PhoneDog’s claims of loss of advertisement revenue, see supra note
197 and accompanying text. R
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PhoneDog’s association with CNBC and Fox News.213  Since Kravitz
had formerly promoted PhoneDog’s website when he appeared on
programs on those networks, and he no longer does, the result is
decreased traffic to the website.214  Claiming that there are in fact
economic relationships with the followers and with the television
networks is probably not PhoneDog’s strongest strategy – the focus
should be on the harm suffered.
In fact, the court hints that the economic relationships that
PhoneDog alleges it had with the Twitter followers and with CNBC
and Fox News is weak at best.215  In a footnote of the January 30
opinion, the court says that Kravitz’s attempt to remove the Twitter
followers and the television networks would be better suited in a
motion for summary judgment as opposed to a motion to dis-
miss.216  The reoccurring question throughout this litigation is
whether PhoneDog will be able to prevail on its claim for inten-
tional interference with prospective economic advantage.
C. Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage
The court initially dismissed PhoneDog’s claim for negligent
interference with prospective economic advantage for the same rea-
sons as the intentional interference claim.217  Citing deficiencies in
PhoneDog’s pleadings as to the existence of economic relation-
ships, the court gave this claim little analysis in either of its opin-
ions.218  While similar to the intentional interference claim, there
are different elements.219  Specifically, the elements of negligent in-
terference with prospective economic advantage are:
(1) an economic relationship existed between the plaintiff
and a third party which contained a reasonably probable
213. For PhoneDog’s relationship claims, see supra note 193 and accompany- R
ing text.
214. For PhoneDog’s relationship claims, see supra note 195 and accompany- R
ing text.
215. See Jan. 30, 2012 Opinion, supra note 11, at *1 n.2 (suggesting that Kra- R
vitz’s concerns might be more appropriately addressed with motion for partial
summary judgment).
216. See id. (“Kravitz’s concerns that the nature of PhoneDog’s relationships
with both the Twitter followers as well as CNBC and Fox News are not ‘economical’
are more properly addressed by a motion for partial summary judgment rather
than a motion to dismiss, particularly where there is another economic relation-
ship being pled by PhoneDog (i.e., the current advertisers).”).
217. See Nov. 8, 2011 Opinion, supra note 11, at *10 (summarizing part of R
court’s holding).
218. See id. at *8-9 (setting forth deficiencies in pleadings).
219. For a discussion of the elements of the claim, see infra note 220 and R
accompanying text.
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future economic benefit or advantage to plaintiff; (2) the
defendant knew of the existence of the relationship and
was aware or should have been aware that if it did not act
with due care its actions would interfere with this relation-
ship and cause plaintiff to lose in whole or in part the
probable future economic benefit or advantage of the re-
lationship; (3) the defendant was negligent; and (4) such
negligence caused damage to plaintiff in that the relation-
ship was actually interfered with or disrupted and plaintiff
lost in whole or in part the economic benefits or advan-
tage reasonably expected from the relationship.220
As noted above, the economic relationships that PhoneDog al-
leges are suspect, though there is a reasonable argument for the
validity of the relationship with current and prospective advertis-
ers.221  The second prong of the claim deals with the defendant’s
knowledge of the relationships and knowledge of the implications
that his or her actions might have.222  Having worked with—or
for—PhoneDog for nearly five years (depending on which set of
pleadings are found to be more accurate), it is not hard to imagine
that Kravitz knew that the majority of the website’s revenues
stemmed from advertisement sales.223  In taking his account with
him, and subsequently directing his 17,000 plus followers to a com-
peting website, Kravitz at the very least should have known that he
would be affecting PhoneDog’s ability to sell advertisements.224
However, as is always the case in any negligence claim, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant owed a duty of care.225  “The
tort of negligent interference with economic relationship arises
only when the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care.”226  As
220. North American Chemical Co. v. Sup. Court, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 466, 479
(Ct. App. 1997).
221. See Jan. 30, 2012 Opinion, supra note 11, at *1 (“[T]he alleged relation- R
ship between PhoneDog and its current and prospective advertisers suffices.”).
222. See Defendant’s Second Motion to Dismiss, supra note 111, at 7 (“(2) the R
defendant knew of the existence of the relationship and was aware or should have
been aware that if it did not act with due care its actions would interfere with this
relationship and cause plaintiff to lose in whole or in part the probable future
economic benefit or advantage of the relationship. . . . “).
223. For discussion of the alleged facts, see supra notes 70-98 and accompany- R
ing text.
224. See id. (summarizing what Kravitz should have reasonably known).
225. See generally Defendant’s Second Motion to Dismiss, supra note 111, at 10 R
(noting duty of care requirement for negligence tort claims).
226. LiMandri v. Judkins, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 539, 551 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing
Stolz v. Wong Communications Ltd. P’ship, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 229, 238 (Ct. App.
1994)).
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noted in the court’s November 8 opinion, “[a]mong the criteria for
establishing a duty of care is the blameworthiness of the defen-
dant’s conduct.  For negligent interference, a defendant’s conduct
is blameworthy only if it was independently wrongful apart from the
interference itself.”227
PhoneDog failed to allege that Kravitz owed them a duty of
care in their initial pleadings, and the court therefore granted Kra-
vitz’s motion to dismiss this claim.228  However, in the first
amended complaint, PhoneDog did allege that Kravitz owed a duty
of care, resulting in denial of Kravitz’s second motion to dismiss the
claim.229  Addressing the blameworthiness of Kravitz’s actions aside
from the interference itself, PhoneDog states that his conduct was
“intended to affect PhoneDog” and that Kravitz “took advantage of
PhoneDog’s economic relationships with CNBC and Fox News in
order to usurp PhoneDog’s contributing spots on [television pro-
grams], such that PhoneDog is no longer able to promote and mar-
ket its services and website on those programs.”230  Further,
PhoneDog cites the misappropriation of trade secrets and conver-
sion claims against Kravitz as evidence of his wrongful conduct.231
It is unclear whether this claim will succeed.  The success of the
claim hinges on PhoneDog’s ability to prove its other claims.
D. Conversion
PhoneDog’s final claim asserts that Kravitz wrongfully con-
verted the Twitter account upon his departure from the com-
pany.232  The elements of a conversion claim under California law
are: “(1) ownership of a right to possession of property; (2) wrong-
227. See Nov. 8, 2011 Opinion, supra note 11, at *9 (internal quotation marks R
omitted).
228. See id. (“With respect to PhoneDog’s allegation that Mr. Kravitz inter-
fered with the economic relationship between it and its users, the court agrees with
Mr. Kravitz that PhoneDog has failed to allege that Mr. Kravitz owed it a duty of
care.”).
229. See Jan. 30, 2012 Opinion, supra note 11, at *2 (quoting First Amended R
Complaint, supra note 84 ¶ 42) (“PhoneDog’s FAC now asserts that ‘[Kravitz] owed R
a duty of care to PhoneDog as an agent of PhoneDog.’”).
230. Plaintiff PhoneDog, LLC’s Opposition to Defendant Noah Kravitz’s Mo-
tion to Dismiss Plaintiff PhoneDog LLC’s Second and Third Claims for Relief in
the First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 12(b)(6) at 10-
11, PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. 3:11-cv-03474-MEJ, 2012 WL 28098 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5,
2012).
231. See id. (noting that other claims, if proven, would evidence wrongful con-
duct independent from interference itself).
232. See Plaintiff’s First Opposition, supra note 75, at 16 (noting that R
PhoneDog requested that Kravitz relinquish account, that he did not, and that it
has suffered harm as result).
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ful disposition of the property right of another; and (3) dam-
ages.”233  Obviously, this claim is at the heart of the case.  The facts
are contested such that it is difficult to determine at this point
whether PhoneDog will be able to prove that it in fact owns or has
the right to immediately possess the account.234  While Kravitz con-
tends that PhoneDog has failed to allege facts that support the con-
version claim, the court simply noted that, “the nature of [the]
claim is at the core of this lawsuit and cannot be determined on the
present record.”235  Many facts still need to be determined, for this
claim and for others; so further analysis of the conversion claim at
this time is not warranted.236
V. #CONCLUSION
“Your ‘brand’, personal or corporate [sic], is very important in the Social
Media Age. Embrace contracts, don’t fear them. Get it in writing!”237
—@noahkravitz
It is difficult to predict how this case will be resolved.238  Some
commentators believe that this should have been settled in the
early stages of litigation, and that it still might be settled before
trial.239  In the event this case does get litigated, however, it may not
233. See Nov. 8, 2011 Opinion, supra note 11, at *9 (citing G.S. Rasmussen & R
Assoc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., 958 F.2d 896, 906 (9th Cir. 1992)).
234. See Scott Palamondon, Is Your Twitter Account a Trade Secret?, THE IP LAW
BLOG (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.theiplawblog.com/archives/-trade-secrets-is-
your-twitter-account-a-trade-secret.html (stating “[u]ltimately, because the
PhoneDog ruling was not based on the substance of PhoneDog’s claims, the court
has provided no significant guidance . . .” as to suit’s possible outcome).
235. See Nov. 8, 2011 Opinion, supra note 11, at *9 (discussing findings of R
court).
236. See id. (interpreting court’s stance that present record is insufficient to
rule on specific issue).
237. Noah Kravitz, Posting of @noahkravitz to Twitter (Dec. 27, 2011, 2:14
PM), available at https://twitter.com/noahkravitz/status/151742692823547905.
238. See Minehan, supra note 11 (quoting John Barry, partner at Proskauer R
Rose: “We are right at the tipping point where we’re going to see lots of these
cases. . . . Are Twitter followers or other social media followers property of the
company or are they personal followers?  There’s no clear answer yet.”); see also
John P. Barry, PROSKAUER ROSE LLP, http://www.proskauer.com/professionals/
john-barry/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (displaying biographical and professional
information about John Barry).
239. See Balasubramani, supra note 203 (discussing court’s denial of Kravitz’s R
motion to dismiss PhoneDog’s amended claims, stating: “I thought PhoneDog’s
claims were weak at best, and the court could have whittled down the litigation and
guided the parties to their ultimate destination – settlement – by culling some of
the claims, but no such luck.”); Venkat Balasubramani, Courts Says Employer’s Law-
suit Against Ex-Employee Over Retention and Use of Twitter Account can Proceed—
PhoneDog v. Kravitz, TECH. & MKTG. LAW BLOG (Nov. 10, 2011) (“This case has
mediation written all over it.”).
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have the profound implications that many thought it might.240  At
this stage, the initial pleadings are the only source of facts, and
many material issues are disputed among the parties.241  Whether
Kravitz was an employee of PhoneDog could be dispositive of the
case.242  He claims to have only been a freelance writer, contracted
with PhoneDog to supply them with reviews and other content.243
If this is the situation, “the case is unlikely to resolve questions
about how the law applies to employees in Twitter ownership dis-
putes with companies.”244
Importantly, even though there has yet to be a final disposition
of the suit, there are measures that can be taken by employers to
avoid contentious situations like the one present in PhoneDog v. Kra-
vitz.245  Citing Benjamin Franklin, one commentator notes that in
regard to social media use in the business world, “[a]n ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure.”246 To begin with, everything
240. See Sherman, supra note 11 (“PhoneDog does not enter court with the R
best of facts in order to decide [the] larger issues of interest to employers and the
social media community.”).
241. For discussion of the alleged facts, see supra notes 70-98 and accompany- R
ing text.
242. See supra notes 243-244 (discussing impact ofKravitz’s employment status R
on potential outcomes).
243. For information on Kravitz’s contentions that he was not an employee of
PhoneDog, but an independent contractor, see supra note 70 and accompanying R
text.
244. See Qualters, supra note 70 (citing Eric Goldman).  For more information R
about Eric Goldman, see supra note 145. R
245. See Maxine Neuhauser & Susan Gross Sholinsky, Ownership of Work-Related
Social Media: Could My Employer Really Own My Twitter and LinkedIn Accounts?, THOM-
SON REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/
Insight/2012/02_-_February/Ownership_of_work-related_social_media__Could_
my_employer_really_own_my_Twitter_and_LinkedIn_accounts_/ (“Companies,
their lawyers, and the courts must keep up with the changes in the workplaces that
social media and technology bring nearly daily.”).  Further, Neuhauser & Gross
Sholinsky state that “[t]he following advice is not new, but never the less remain
fresh: The best way to protect a company’s intellectual property is through written
agreements, oversight, and enforcement.” Id.; see also Minehan, supra note 11 (out- R
lining problems faced by employers and steps employers should take to protect
social media assets).  “While cases like PhoneDog’s begin to wend their way
through the courts, establishing precedent, employers should be taking steps on
their own to protect themselves.” Id. See also Sherman, supra note 11 (providing R
various issues faced by employers and employees pertaining to social media ac-
counts in business or commercial settings and recommending precautionary mea-
sures); Genova, supra note 152 (examining PhoneDog case and suggesting methods R
to avoid such issues).
246. Shawne Tuma, Your Business Needs a Social Media Policy and This is Why,
BRITTON TUMA (Dec. 30, 2011), http://shawnetuma.com/2011/12/30/your-busi-
ness-needs-a-social-media-policy-and-this-is-why/ (providing Franklin quotation as
maxim for employers to consider, stating “[t]hat old saying could not be more true
than when it comes to having a social media policy for your business.”).  For an-
other source providing this quotation of Benjamin Franklin, see The Electric Ben
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should be in writing.247  Contracts and policies should reflect that
all social media accounts are being developed for the employer,
and that the employer intends to retain all ownership rights to the
account and content of the account.248  Further, employers should
update non-solicitation agreements to preclude employees from
contacting former customers through social media.249
It is also important for employers to take an active role in the
use of social media as an advertising tool for their brand.250  This
includes requiring that multiple employees use social media in an
effort to “[e]stablish a connection between followers and the
brand, not followers and the individual doing the posting.”251  Fur-
ther, by having various employees administering a single account,
employers are better able to “assert[ ] control over the account . . .
[and] demonstrate ‘ownership’ of the account.”252
Robert J. Kolansky*
Franklin: The Quotable Franklin, USHISTORY.ORG, http://www.ushistory.org/frank-
lin/quotable/singlehtml.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
247. See Minehan, supra note 11 (suggesting employers should address social R
media ownership in policies and contracts); see also id. (“The best course of action
is to consult with legal counsel to craft policies that clearly assert the rights of
employers to social media accounts used on their behalf and to the material cre-
ated within them.”).
248. See id. (suggesting that companies specify social media ownership in con-
tracts and policies).
249. See id. (noting importance of removing geographical restrictions in non-
solicitation agreements because they are no longer useful in social media age).
250. See Sherman, supra note 11 (suggesting measures for employers to take R
to control use of social media).
251. See Minehan, supra note 11 (quoting business uses for social media). R
252. See Sherman, supra note 11 (describing safeguards for businesses’ owner- R
ship of social media accounts).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Villanova University School of Law; B.A.,
Bucknell University, 2010.
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